, then the proposed scheme has the same complexity as the codes given in [10] and a redundancy of 4 ¡ £ ¥ 6 5 7 £ 9 8 1 "
which is slightly better than the redundancy of the method in [10] . But if we allow a little bit more computational effort with 
This is definitely better than the redundancy of the method in [10] . Finally, note that if the balanced code used in step S1 of the encoding algorithm is optimal (thus requiring approximately g BC E 1 " $ 2 3 £ redundant bits) then the redundancy of the proposed code will be
Currently, the most efficient way to realize optimal balanced codes is by using an enumerative encoding technique [5] , [7, p. 117 bits. Thus at present, the use of optimal balanced codes will result in quite high complexity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet applications, information security in today's world is more important than that in any previous eras. Designing cryptosystems that meet requirements of communication bandwidth, information rate, computational speed, and various security strategies has become a very challenging task for researchers.
In the most widely used modern cryptosystems, such as the RSA [18] , the Diffie-Hellman public-key distribution scheme [3] , the ElGamal cryptosystem [5] , and DSS [16] , increasing the size of the modulus is necessary in order to strengthen their security.
From the point of the linear feedback shift-register (LFSR) sequences, the exponential function which used in the RSA encryption, the Diffie-Hellman (DH) public-key exchange scheme [3] , and the ElGamal digital signature scheme is a first-order LFSR sequence over GF
is a product of two prime numbers. In the literature, there is another family of public-key cryptosystems similar to RSA, DH, and ElGamal public-key cryptosystems, which are called the Dickson polynomial scheme [13] - [15] or LUC [20] , [21] , respectively. The mathematical function used in this family of the public-key cryptosystems is the second-order LFSR sequence over GF
with a special initial state. This kind of LFSR sequences are coset constant [8] . We will give their definition in Section II. (Note: throughout of this correspondence, we will use the term LFSR sequences over GF
instead of linear recurring sequences over GF
, since the term of initial state is related to an LFSR.)
In this correspondence, we will explore to construct public-key cryptosystems by using third-order LFSR sequences over GF
. First, we will investigate the cryptographic properties of thirdorder LFSR sequences and propose a fast computational algorithm to evaluate the th term of a third-order characteristic sequence. Based on these properties, we will construct two public-key cryptographic algorithms. One is a public-key distribution scheme that can reduce the size of the modulus while speeding up the computation. The security is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm in GF
. Another one is a RSA-type encryption algorithm whose security is based on the difficulty of factoring a large composite integer. We will also discuss their security, implementation, information rate, and computational cost.
For the theory of LFSR sequences, the reader is refereed to [8] , [12] , and for the fundamental theory of finite fields, see [12] .
II. RHIRD-ORDER CHARACTERISTIC SEQUENCES
, where ¡ is a prime and
( 1) be a polynomial over
. A sequence be the characteristic sequence generated by
, where .
iii) It follows from ii).
is the reciprocal polynomial of 
Thus , the system of equations
has a unique solution
. In other words, Proof: Q.E.D.
Remark: Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 will play key roles in constructing a public-key distribution scheme, since the former guarantees the commutative property and the later provides a one-to-one correspondence between the private key space and the public key space. Fact 1, together with Lemma 2, will be used to construct an RSA-type encryption scheme.
III. FAST COMPUTATIONAL METHOD
In [7] , there is an algorithm to calculate the th term of any linear recurring sequences. Here we will provide a much more efficient algorithm to calculate the th term of a third-order characteristic sequence. 
which gives i). The same argument can be applied to ii). Q.E.D.
, and
From Lemma 3, the recurrence can be described by the following formulas.
For
and
Since ¢ ¡ ¥ and ¢ ¡ h ¥ are symmetric in (7)- (12) Note: This method is much more efficient than the algorithm using modulo polynomial [7] . The algorithm provided in [7] 
IV. A PUBLIC-KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
In this section, we will present a public-key distribution (GH-PKD) scheme that is constructed by a pair of third-order characteristic sequences and discuss its security.
A. GH-PKD Scheme
Key-Generation Phase:
• System public parameters: f is a prime number, andR© q % P 
Selects u % as her private key. Her public key is private keys to the space of the public keys is bijective. Thus there will be different public keys corresponding to different private keys in GH-PKD. Moreover, the size of the space of private (or public) keys is
is the Euler function. iii) In each key exchange session, the computational cost for each user is
B. Security of GH-PKD
The security for GH key distribution scheme is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm in GF 
.A sa result, once . According to [1] , [2] , [6] , [9] , and [11] , solving the discrete logarithm in GF , where x 's are given by Table I 
, may be one of three cases as listed below:
Case 2: 
According to the method for solving a cubic equation in a finite field in [17] , substituting We denote
B. Security
It is clear that the security of the scheme is based on the difficulty of factoring a large composite integer.
C. Computational Cost
As in the RSA public-key system, we can choose a small such that the computational cost for computing the th terms of the thirdorder characteristic sequence with
